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No. 76-1450
LANDMARK COMMUNICATIONS, INC.

v.
VIRGINIA
SUMMARY:

State/Criminal

TIMELY

Appellant-newspaper challenges on First Amendment

grounds its misdemeanor conviction for violation of a Va. statute
which provides for the confidentiality of all papers filed with and
proceedings before the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission (Commission) .
FACTS:

~
Art. VI, §10 of the 1971 Constitution of Va. mandates

the Commission "to investigate charges which would be the basis for
retirement, censure, or removal of a judge."

It also specifies that

"(p)roceedings before the Commission shall be confidential."

Va. Code

§2.1-37.13 provides that "all papers filed with and proceedings before
the Commission • • . including the identification of the subject judg e
• • • shall be confidential and shall not be divulged by any person to

r

- 2 anyone except the Commission, except th'a t the record of any proceeding filed with the Supreme Court shall lose its confidential character

"

The statute also subjects to a misdemeanor penalty "any person

who shall divulge information in violation of (its provisions)."

On Oct. 4. 1975. appellant oublished in The

rc.-\

Virginian-Pilot-~

a newspaper of general circulation in the Tidewater area of Va.--an
article stating that the Commission had conducted a "formal hearing
concerning oossible disciolinary

actio~

aaainst" a named iudge and

that the hearina "aooarently stemmed from charges of incompetence
aaainst the . . . judge."
of

~2.1-37.13

Aooellant was tried and convicted for violatio

and fined S500.

DECISION BELOW:
constitutionality~£

Va.

· sc,

one justice dissenting, sustained the

the challenged

st~tute.

The majority first

rejected appellant's claim that the statute must be strictly construed
to apply only to the first act of disclosure by an actual participant
in the proceedings.

The court found that the proscription running

against disclosure--until the filing of a formal complaint with Va.
SC--is so clear from the statutory language as to render unreasonable
an interpretation limiting the language only to participants in the
Commission proceedings or to make actionable only the initial disclosur
'J'he court, . rej ectj ng appellant's contention--abandoned in this
Court-~that

the law . imposed a prior restraint on the press, considered

whether the "subsequent punishment" imposed by the statute violated
the guarantee of a free press.

The court, citing a series of decision s

applying the "clear and present danger" test to cases involving public CJ
~

-

tions alleged to imperil the orderly administration of justice, reject c
appellant's view that the test must be satisfied by production of "actu
facts" to show a clear and present danger.

Bridges, et al. involved

*Br1dges v. Cal1forn1a, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Penneknm_e v. Florida, 328
U.S. 331 (1946); Craig v. !!_arvey, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); and- Wood v.
Geor9ia, 370 u.s. 375 (1962).

-

~

-

the common law power of a court to punish allegedly contemptuous out-of
court statements concerning pending ca?es.

(

By contrast, ·the court foun

the power of a Va. court to impose the instant punishment is fixed by
statute.

The court concluded that §2.1-37.13 represents a legislative

judgment, coupled with the statement of public intent expressed in the
Va. Constitution, that a clear and present danger to the orderly

7

\

administration of justice would be created by premature disclosure of

\ the confidential proceedings of the Commission.

The court held "the

judgment imposing the sanction in this case is fortified against
(appellant's) constitutional attack because it is 'encased in the
armor wrought by prior legislative deliberation'

[Brid~,

314 U.S. at

II

261] •

Va. SC further found that the challenged statute places the leas t

)

possible restraint upon the public interest while assuring the effecti v
functioning of the Commission.

It stressed that, when a formal com-

plaint is filed, the entire record of Commission proceedings becomes
public and that the statute does not curtail general comment or
criticism concerning a judge or the conduct of 'udicial affairs _
Justice Poff dissented on the ground that the majority erred in
inferring the existence of a clear and present danger from the mere
enactment

o~

a penal statute.

Noting a "legal presumption" in favor

of the First Amendment, the dissent would require evidence--not produc e
by the Commonwealth in this case--showing a clear and present danger

7
(

to a legitimate governmental interest in order to justify any statutor y
exception to the constitutional guarantee.
CONTENTIONS:

Appellant asserts that the publication of

truthful statements may not be the subject of civil or criminal
sanctions where public af~airs are concerned.

Rather, the Commission

-

...

may withhold what it can and the press may publish what it learns,
~-

~

........

the balance favoring public discourse.

Appellee counters that the

Commonwealth has followed the procedure outlined in Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975), i.e., to "avoid public
documentation or other exposure of private information" where privacy
interests in judicial proceedings are to be protected.

z(?

Appellant finds the clear and present danger test applicable

' here, but argues that proof of actual facts establishing that the
expression in question creates such a danger to the administration of
justice is essential.
trial.]

[The Commonwealth offered no such proof at

Appellant emphasizes that there is no support in the legisla-

tive history for the court's conclusion that the Va. Gen. Assembly

\

made any finding of a clear and present danger.

D

va.

(

sc

Appellee tracks the

on this point.

-

Appellant attacks the statute as vague arguing that:

the meaning

of "divulge'' is unclear; there is no indication here that the published
information consisted of "papers filed with and proceedings before the
Commission;'' the statute gives no fair warning that it applies to
parties who obtain the information after initial disclosure by
parties privy to it or that its sweep encompasses the press or that
it applies to all information concerning a Commission proceeding whethe 2
or. not such information was obtained from ma·terial before the Commission .
Appellant also complains that the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad insofar as it prohibits publication of the charge that impropriet:
prevented an incompetent judge from having a complaint filed against
him,

Also, appellant contends that readers of the article repeat

what they read at their

pe~il.

2\ppellee notes that the vagueness

e relating to what material ,

are encompassed within the statute was not raised in va. SC and should

not be considered.
DISCUSSION:

(

It appears that some 40 jurisdictions provide for

-

similar judicial review commissions but, according to appellee, only
Hawaii and Va. impose criminal sanctions for breach of confidentiality.

----- ' - - - -------------------------Following decision of this case in Va. SC, USDC (ED Va.) (Merhige )

issued a TRO restraining prosecution of a Va. TV station under the
statute challenged here.

The order has since expired.

Thereafter, a

motion for a TRO against the prosecution of a Richmond publisher was
denied by Judge Warriner who, according to appellant, stated his belief
:;

that the state law was unconstitutional, but, in light of the Va. SC
decision, was unabl

to find it "patently and flagrantly unconstitution-

al."
The issue her

is

subs~ial~Appellee

suggests that the

criminal sanction i posed by Va. is tne remedy suggested in the
('-"

concurring opinions in New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
713 (1971).

There is a
6/1/77

PJN

(_

y consideration may be warranted.
to affirm.
Goltz

Va. SC op in appx.
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No. 76-1450 Landmark Communications v. Commonwealth of Va.
This appeal from the Virginia Supreme Court involves
the validity of the Virginia statute that implements the
Virginia constitutional provisions with respect to a "Judicial
Inquiry and Review Commission".
Section 2.1-37.13 provides for the confidentiality of
all papers filed with and proceedings before the Commission.
It also provides:
Any ~ rs~n ~h~ shall divulge information in violation
of
e provisions of this section shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor".

The Virginia-Pilot published an article that
identified a judge who had been under investigation by the
Commission.

The newspaper was prosecuted and convicted of a

misdemeanor and the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction.

It sustained the validity of the confidentiality

provision against First Amendment and vagueness challenges.
Article 6,

§

10 of the Constitution of Virginia

requires the General Assembly to create a Judicial Inquiry and
Review Commission, and provides that:

2.
Proceedings before the Commission that be confidential.
The Constitutional provision does not specify that
infringement of the confidentiality may be punished as a
crime.

Indeed, the constitutional mandate is general in its

~

terms, and is not at issue in this case.*
I have read the principal briefs, and it seems to me
that appellant must win on the First Amendment issue.

I agree

that the public interest probably would be better served if the
confidential portion of the Commission's work were
confidential.
jury.

In many ways, it resembles that of a grand

If an employee of the Commission divulged confidential

information, perhaps penalties could be imposed.

But here a

newspaper apparently obtained the information by a leak from an
unknown source.

irre ~nsible,
~

While its publication may well have been

I think it was protected by the First Amendment.

As the appellant's brief states:

"The Commission may withhold

and keep secret what it can; the press may print what it
learns."

Br. 25.
L.F.P., Jr.

*I was a member of the Constitutional Revision Commisson that
included this article. Three present members of the Virginia
Supreme Court also were on the Commission: Justices Harrison
(Chairman of the Commission), Harman and Cochran. All three of
these Justices participated in the decision below. Although I
"passed" when the jurisdictional statement was under discussion
at our Conference last Term, I now see no reason why I should
not participate.

TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Nancy Bregstein
RE:

DATE:

Jan. 2, 1978

No. 76-1450, Landmark Communications, Inc.
v. Virginia

You suggested that a short memo would suffice in
this case; this is just to note my agreement with the view
expressed in your Aid to Memory that application of the
Virginia statute to appellant violated the First Amendment.
The main question in my mind is whether the Court
should adopt either of the broad approaches suggested by
appellant and supporting
press

~eV~£

~~ici,

to declare (1) that the

may be punished for publishing the truth about

matters involving public officials or (2) that the statute
is unconstitutional on its face, or to take a more limited

:~

.

t at the statute was applied uncon-

seance by

stitutionally on the facts of this case.

The narrowness of

the facts as presented here is two-fold:

(1)

There is no

evidence as to how the newspaper got its information, so it
can be assumed that there was a leak and that the press
merely published information already in its possession: the
information published was truthful and merely conveyed
accurate information: and the most substantial of the
State's interests (encouragement of the effectiveness and
proper functioning of the Commission by protecting
complainants and witnesses) is not implicated.

(2)

There

is little evidence, if any, of the legislature's assessment
of the substantiality of the interests at stake.

Nor do we

have any assessment of how much confidentiality, if any,
would be lost if there were no criminal sanctions for
divulging what went on at Commission proceedings.

Only two

of the 30 or more States that have judicial inquiry
commissions provide for criminal penalties for breach of

-

c onfidentiality.

The first observation relates solely to

the facts of this case: the second relates to the amount of
deference to be accorded to the statute in general.
Although courts can go beyond the particular facts
of a First Amendment case involving overbreadth, to
consider interests beyond those asserted by the

~
~

particular ~

parties before the court, I do not think the Court has to

-

reach the overbreadth claim here.
~

Here the statute has

been applied in the clearest situation for First Amendment

---

~~-.~

~

~~

3.

protection:

truthful publication by a newspaper of
~

information concerning proceedings involving a public
official.

The Court need only say that this

unconstitutional.
whether the

Stat~

application~

That way the Court need not address
ever may punish a newspaper for truthful

reporting of facts about public officials or whether it
ever may punish other persons, such as participants in the
proceedings, for divulging "confidential" information.
My reason for seeking to avoid the latter issue in
particular is that it relates to the issues whether a judge
may impose a gag order on participants in a criminal trial
or bar the public (including the press) from criminal
proceedings

(~~.,the

suppression hearing in the

Philadelphia Newspapers case).

If the Court were to hold

in this case that a participant in a judicial inquiry
proceeding could not be punished for leaking information to
the press, that would imply that a person could not be
punished for disobeying a judge's "gag" order in a criminal
trial.

(Of course there is the distinction that a criminal

trial--and therefore a defendant's rights to a fair
trial--is not at issue here.)

There are strong arguments,

of course, that the participant in the judicial inquiry
proceeding may not be held criminally responsible for a
leak--because of the guarantee of freedom of speech; but I
do not think the Court should decide that question in
deciding this case.
Nor is it necessary for the Court to say that

~2

State interest would be sufficient to punish a newspaper

4.

for divulging confidential information.

The State's

interest would have to be of the highest order, of course,
and such an interest rarely if ever is found; but there is
no need to pre-judge that case now.
The questions mentioned above are harder than the
question presented here, and should be left open.

Another

question that the Court need not decide here is whether,
assuming that a participant could be punished for divulging
confidential information, the press could be punished for
soliciting such a leak.

Since there is no evidence that

that is what happened here, the Court can treat the case as
one involving publication of information already in the

~~

~

possession of the press, even though the case is not as
strong as Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420

u.s.

~~

469,

where the information truly was "public" and made so by the ~·

w-/o

State.

on ~

My first preference would be to decide the case

-

- -

a straight First Amendment basis and not to reach the
vagueness or overbreadth challenges.

.J.o~

L,~~~-~

There may be some

-vt

pressure, however, to reach the overbreadth claim, because
otherwise the statute remains on the books and chills the

First Amendment rights of others, such as the participants
in the proceedings.

Since a party has standing to make an

overbreadth claim for others, it seems that appellant has
standing to challenge the entire statute, not just its
application to Landmark.

~

But since the Court will hold the

Jo

statute unconstitutional as applied, there does not seem to
be any need to reach other issues as
unnecessary to the decision.
N.B.

~ell.
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CHAMBERS Of'

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

January 16, 1978

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

Re:

No.

76~1450,

Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia

I vote to reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Virginia.

When the State seeks to punish criminally the making

of truthful statements about public officials relating to their
performance of their public duties, it must meet a very
stringent burden of justification.
failed to meet this burden.

In my view, the State has

All of the interests asserted by

the State relate to the maintenance of the confidentiality of
Judicial Commission proceedings, and such confidentiality can
be maintained by methods less

burdensom~

to clearly protected

speech than the method at issue here.
With regard to defining the interest protected, I would
prefer not to place too much weight on the fact that this case
involves a newspaper.

The statute at issue applies to any

person who divulges Commission information, so that, for
example, an individual who reads about a Commission proceeding
in the newspaper and repeats it to a friend would apparently
have violated the statute.

I would hold that such an

individual is as much protected as is the newspaper, rather
than giving the press any special protection in the
circumstances of this case.

--J_/Vt
. .

The

cc:

,.,.:;H!i

'·

'
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T. :\I.

I
H._\ B.
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